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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

INFORMATION

November 22, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM: PHILLIP RINGDAHL *PR*
SUBJECT: South African Response to Negotiations

EM
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file

Attached is a copy of South Africa's response to our on-the-table negotiating proposal. It is not very forthcoming and registers the same concerns made in President Botha's letter to the President (number of Cubans present at the time of Namibian elections, perceived U.S. abandonment of parallel S.A./Cuban withdrawals, effect on UNITA, verification of Cuban withdrawal). In the end, S.A. agrees to our proposed "80-20 formula" (80% CTW the first year, the remaining 20% by the end of the second), but then imposes many conditions to the agreement which we cannot accept as they stand (Para 8 (III), for instance).

Chet Crocker will be meeting the Angolans in Lusaka Nov 27-28. Frank Wisner said Crocker briefed RCM in Geneva on the planned meetings. The Angolans will probably want to appear positive in order to forestall U.S. assistance to Savimbi, and we will want to be certain that any Angolan proposals are 1) specific, 2) genuine, and 3) short-term in their implementation. Otherwise, we should remain unconvinced they represent anything new.

Attachment

Tab A Copy of ltr from Amb. Beukes to State

SECRET
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SECRET



EMBASSY OF SOUTH AFRICA
3051 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

November 22, 1985

Ambassador Frank G Wisner
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Department of State
WASHINGTON DC 20515

Dear Frank

I attach the contents of a letter dated November 22, 1985 addressed by Foreign Minister R F Botha to Secretary of State George P Shultz.

It would be appreciated if the contents of the letter could be brought to the attention of the Secretary of State. The letter will be handed to Ambassador Herman Nickel in Pretoria today.

With kind regards

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Herbert Beukes".

HERBERT BEUKES
Ambassador

22 NOVEMBER 1985

DEAR MR SECRETARY

1. THE SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION WHICH HELD TALKS WITH DR CHESTER CROCKER AND MR FRANK WISNER IN WASHINGTON ON 24 AND 25 SEPTEMBER 1985, HAS REPORTED TO ME IN FULL ON THEIR DISCUSSIONS.

2. I WAS PLEASED THAT DURING THE TALKS WE WERE ABLE TO REAFFIRM OUR MUTUAL COMMITMENT TO THE FOLLOWING OBJECTIVES WHICH HAVE PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR OUR COOPERATION IN SOUTH WESTERN AFRICA SINCE 1981:

(I) CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA.

(II) SWA/NAMIBIAN INDEPENDENCE THROUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 435.

(III) THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA.

(IV) NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA AND, TO THIS END, ASSURANCES THAT UNITA WOULD NOT BE THE VICTIM OF A SWA/NAMIBIA/ANGOLA SETTLEMENT.

3. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ANGOLA MAKE THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET AND SURROGATE FORCES FROM THAT COUNTRY MORE URGENT THAN EVER. SOUTH AFRICA IS COMMITTED TO THIS OBJECTIVE BECAUSE OF THE THREAT WHICH THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET POWER IN ANGOLA WOULD POSE TO OUR REGION AND BECAUSE OF THE NEGATIVE EFFECT WHICH A CONTINUING CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA MIGHT HAVE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435.

4. IT SHOULD BE RECALLED THAT IT WAS ON THE UNDERSTANDING THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ABLE TO NEGOTIATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA THAT SOUTH AFRICA AGREED IN JUNE 1981 TO RECONSIDER ITS POSITION ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435. AS YOU KNOW SOUTH AFRICA SUBSEQUENTLY COOPERATED WITH THE CONTACT GROUP IN ITS PHASED APPROACH TO ADDRESS THE ISSUES OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES, IMPARTIALITY AND SECURITY. BY AUGUST 1983 THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL WAS ABLE TO REPORT THAT ALL THE OTHER MAJOR OBSTACLES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435 HAD BEEN REMOVED. THIS PROGRESS WAS, THROUGHOUT, BASED ON THE SUPPOSITION THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ABLE TO BRING ABOUT THE GENUINE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS FROM ANGOLA.

5. AS YOU ARE AWARE, YOUR 'SYNTHESIS PAPER' OF 21 MARCH 1985 CREATED SOME SERIOUS AND LEGITIMATE CONCERNS FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WHICH WERE DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR ABOVE-MENTIONED OBJECTIVES. AMONG THESE WERE:

(I) THE NUMBER OF CUBANS WHO MIGHT STILL BE IN ANGOLA AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION IN TERMS OF UNSCR 435.

(II) THE APPARENT ABANDONMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PARALLEL AND SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WHICH SOUTH AFRICA HAD REGARDED AS ITS MOST RELIABLE SAFEGUARD THAT THE MPLA AND THE CUBANS WOULD ADHERE TO THE AGREEMENT.

(III) THE MANNER IN WHICH THE AGREEMENT MIGHT AFFECT UNITA.

(IV) THE LACK OF SAFEGUARD PROCEDURES AND ASSURANCES THAT ONCE SOUTH AFRICA HAD COMMITTED ITSELF TO IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435 THE MPLA AND THE CUBANS WOULD HONOUR THE AGREEMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL.

6. OUR DELEGATION POINTED OUT TO DR CROCKER THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD NEVERTHELESS BE PREPARED TO GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE 800/0 - 200/0 FORMULA FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS. IT SOUGHT,

HOWEVER, CLARIFICATION OF THE UNITED STATES REACTION TO THE FOLLOWING SOUTH AFRICAN CONCERNS:

(I) WHETHER AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED WITH THE MPLA ON A VERIFICATION SYSTEM TO DETERMINE

(A) HOW MANY CUBANS THERE WERE IN ANGOLA, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE NUMBER OF CUBANS IN THE ANGOLAN ARMED FORCES WHO MIGHT ALREADY HAVE ACQUIRED ANGOLAN CITIZENSHIP,

(B) HOW THE REDUCTION OF CUBAN FORCES WOULD BE VERIFIED,

(C) WHAT CATEGORIES OF CUBAN FORCES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE 800/0 WHO WOULD DEPART DURING THE FIRST YEAR AND WHAT CATEGORIES WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE 200/0 WHO WOULD DEPART DURING THE SECOND YEAR.

(II) WHAT ASSURANCE COULD BE GIVEN THAT THE RESIDUAL CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA WOULD NOT DETRIMENTALLY EFFECT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435 AND THE OUTCOME OF THE PROPOSED ELECTION,

(III) WHAT ASSURANCE COULD BE GIVEN THAT ONCE SOUTH AFRICA HAD ACCEPTED IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 435 THE CUBANS AND THE ANGOLANS WOULD HONOUR THE AGREEMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL.

7. DR CROCKER CONVEYED THE FOLLOWING REPLIES TO OUR DELEGATION ON THESE QUESTIONS:

(I) VERIFICATION

DR CROCKER SAID THAT ANGOLA HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO VERIFICATION BY UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS DESIGNATED BY THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL. HE ADDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD USE ITS OWN SUBSTANTIAL 'NATIONAL TECHNICAL AND OTHER MEANS' TO MONITOR CUBAN WITHDRAWAL.

(II) ASSURANCES THAT THE CUBAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA WOULD NOT DETRIMENTALLY AFFECT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435 OR THE OUTCOME OF THE PROPOSED ELECTION FOR THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

DR CROCKER PROPOSED THAT THE REPUBLIC AND MPLA SHOULD ENTER INTO DISCUSSIONS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON THE TIMING AND VERIFICATION OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE 800/0 OF THE CUBAN FORCES WHICH WOULD LEAVE ANGOLA DURING THE FIRST YEAR AND OF THE 200/0 WHO WOULD DEPART DURING THE SECOND YEAR. AGREEMENT

WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE REACHED ON THE COMPOSITION, DEPLOYMENT AND ROLE OF THE FORCES WHICH WOULD BE WITHDRAWN DURING THE FIRST YEAR AND OF THOSE WHO WOULD BE WITHDRAWN DURING THE SECOND YEAR.

(III) ASSURANCES THAT THE MPLA AND CUBA WOULD COMPLY WITH THE AGREEMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL

DR CROCKER AGREED THAT IT WAS REASONABLE THAT SOUTH AFRICA SHOULD SEEK ASSURANCES THAT ONCE THE REPUBLIC HAD COMMITTED ITSELF TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF UNSCR 435, THE MPLA AND CUBA WOULD CARRY OUT THEIR SIDE OF THE AGREEMENT. IN THIS REGARD DR CROCKER MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

(A) THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT NORMALISE ALL ASPECTS OF ITS DIPLOMATIC AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE MPLA IN ONE INSTALMENT. FULL NORMALISATION WOULD BE CONTINGENT UPON MPLA COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT. THE IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONSWULD, IF NECESSARY BE FROZEN OR REVERSED,

(B) THE AGREEMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE 'ENSHRINED' IN A SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION,

(C) THE MPLA WOULD HAVE TO TAKE NOTE OF THE REPEAL OF THE CLARK AMENDMENT AND OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE UNITED STATES MIGHT BE ABLE TO ASSIST UNITA,

(D) SOUTH AFRICA WOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO TAKE ACTION. IF THE MPLA DID NOT COMPLY WITH ITS UNDERTAKINGS SOUTH AFRICA WOULD BE ABLE TO FREEZE, OR REVERSE THE STATION.

(E) THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT ACCEPT ANY 'TRICKS' SUCH AS THE NATURALIZATION OF CUBAN FORCES, THEIR WITHDRAWAL TO NEARBY COUNTRIES, OR THEIR REPLACEMENT BY OTHER HOSTILE FORCES.

8. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE ASSURANCES THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WOULD BE PREPARED TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE THAT 800/0 OF THE CUBANS SHOULD BE WITHDRAWN DURING THE FIRST YEAR AND 200/0 DURING THE SECOND YEAR SUBJECT TO:

(I). THE ACCEPTABILITY TO SOUTH AFRICA OF THE PROPOSED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 'ENSHRINING' THE AGREEMENT ON CUBAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLA,

(II) SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT WITH THE MPLA ON:

(A) THE VERIFICATION PROCESS, INCLUDING COMPOSITION OF THE VERIFICATION TEAMS, THEIR DEPLOYMENT AND THEIR FUNCTIONS. IN THIS REGARD SOUTH AFRICA HAS RESERVATIONS CONCERNING THE UNITED NATIONS' ROLE AND WOULD WANT TO HAVE ITS OWN OBSERVERS INVOLVED IN THE VERIFICATION PROCESS OR, AT THE VERY LEAST, TO HAVE INDEPENDENT OBSERVERS DESIGNATED BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND AGREED TO BY SOUTH AFRICA AND THE MPLA,

(B) THE COMPOSITION, DEPLOYMENT AND ROLE OF THE CUBANS WHO WOULD BE WITHDRAWN DURING THE FIRST YEAR AND OF THOSE WHO WOULD BE WITHDRAWN DURING THE SECOND YEAR,

(C) THE TIMING OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE CUBANS DURING THE FIRST YEAR IN SUCH A MANNER THAT BY THE TIME OF THE ELECTION IN TERMS OF UNSCR 435 A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF CUBANS WOULD HAVE LEFT ANGOLA TO ENSURE THAT THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS WOULD BE IRREVERSIBLE.

SOUTH AFRICA WOULD FURTHER REQUIRE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO POSSIBILITY THAT THOSE CUBANS REMAINING IN ANGOLA WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO AFFECT DETRIMENTALLY THE IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS AND THE ENVISAGED ELECTION.

(III) CONFIRMATION BY THE UNITED STATES THAT:

(A) IN THE PROCESS OF IMPROVING ITS RELATIONS WITH THE MPLA, IT WOULD CONTINUE TO PURSUE OUR COMMON OBJECTIVE OF SUPPORTING THE GOAL OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA AND TO THIS END, WOULD ASSURE THAT UNITA WOULD NOT BE THE VICTIM OF A SWA/NAMIBIA/ANGOLA SETTLEMENT. ACCORDINGLY NO FORMAL NORMALISATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE USA AND THE MPLA WOULD OCCUR BEFORE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN ANGOLA HAD BEEN ACHIEVED.

(B) THE UNITED STATES WOULD, IN COOPERATION WITH THE RSA, COMPENSATE UNITA FOR ANY POSSIBLE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS WHICH MIGHT ARISE FOR IT AS A RESULT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SWA/NAMIBIA/MPLA SETTLEMENT, IN SUCH A WAY THAT UNITA'S OVERALL CAPABILITY WOULD NOT BE IMPAIRED.

(C) THE UNITED STATES WOULD, IN THE EVENT OF A BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT BY THE MPLA, EFFECTIVELY PROTECT SOUTH AFRICA FROM INTERNATIONAL PUNITIVE MEASURES SHOULD THE RSA TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION TO SECURE ITS RIGHTS IN TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT.

9. WE WOULD HOPE THAT ON THIS BASIS WE WILL BE ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD THE ACHIEVEMENT OF GENUINE CUBAN WITHDRAWAL. I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXPLORE EVERY AVENUE IN OUR SEARCH FOR A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT IN THIS REGARD.

WITH KIND REGARDS

R F BOTHA
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

MR GEORGE P SHULTZ
SECRETARY OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON DC